İleri Demokrasilerde Politik Bütçe Dalgalanmaları Ortaya Çıkar Mı?

Sedef ŞEN (Kastamonu Üniversitesi, İktisat Bölümü, Kastamonu, Türkiye)
Gümüşhane Üniversitesi Sosyal Bilimler Dergisi
1 0
Yıl: 2020 Cilt: 11 Sayı: 3 Sayfa Aralığı: 728 - 743 Metin Dili: Türkçe İndeks Tarihi: 04-03-2021

İleri Demokrasilerde Politik Bütçe Dalgalanmaları Ortaya Çıkar Mı?

Öz:
Bu çalışmada çeşitli kriterlere göre seçilmiş 42 adet ülke için ileri demokrasinin hakim olduğu seçim dönemlerinde politikacılarınyeniden seçilebilmek amacı ile mali araçlar üzerinde herhangi bir manipülasyon girişiminin olup olmadığı araştırılmıştır. Bu amaçlaçalışmada 2001-2018 yılları arasını kapsayan dengeli panel veri seti kullanılmıştır. Ekonometrik metodolojide başvurulan yöntemfarklarda dinamik ve genelleştirilmiş momentler modelleri olmuştur. Mali gösterge olarak ise mali denge, mali gelir ve kamu harcamasıgöz önüne alınmıştır. Seçim odaklı dalgalanmaların araştırıldığı bu çalışmadan elde edilen sonuçlara göre, seçim değişkeninin hemfarklarda dinamik model hem de genelleştirilmiş momentler modeli için sadece kamu harcaması değişkeni üzerinde pozitif veistatistiksel olarak anlamlı bir etkisi olduğu gösterilmiştir. Diğer bir deyişle seçim zamanlarında kamu harcamaları üzerinde politik bütçedalgalanmalarının görülmekte olduğu ve ileri demokrasiye sahip ülkelerde politikacıların seçimi kazanabilmek amacı ile manipülasyonabaşvurduğu tespit edilmiştir.
Anahtar Kelime:

Do Political Budget Cycles Exist in Advanced Democracies?

Öz:
In this study, it has been explored whether there have been any manipulation attempts on fiscal instruments in order to the reelection of politicians during the electoral periods dominated by advanced democracy for 42 countries selected by various criteria. For this aim, a balanced panel data set covering the period 2001-2018 was used in the study. The methods applied in econometric methodology have been the difference between dynamic, and generalized moments models. Fiscal balance, fiscal revenue and government expenditure are considered as fiscal indicators. According to econometric results, it has been shown that the election variable has a positive and statistically significant effect only on the government expenditure variable both in the difference between dynamic and generalized moments models. In other words, political budget cycles are observed in the election periods and it is confirmed that for the reelection purpose politicians make benefit of manipulation.
Anahtar Kelime:

Belge Türü: Makale Makale Türü: Araştırma Makalesi Erişim Türü: Erişime Açık
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APA SEN S (2020). İleri Demokrasilerde Politik Bütçe Dalgalanmaları Ortaya Çıkar Mı?. , 728 - 743.
Chicago SEN Sedef İleri Demokrasilerde Politik Bütçe Dalgalanmaları Ortaya Çıkar Mı?. (2020): 728 - 743.
MLA SEN Sedef İleri Demokrasilerde Politik Bütçe Dalgalanmaları Ortaya Çıkar Mı?. , 2020, ss.728 - 743.
AMA SEN S İleri Demokrasilerde Politik Bütçe Dalgalanmaları Ortaya Çıkar Mı?. . 2020; 728 - 743.
Vancouver SEN S İleri Demokrasilerde Politik Bütçe Dalgalanmaları Ortaya Çıkar Mı?. . 2020; 728 - 743.
IEEE SEN S "İleri Demokrasilerde Politik Bütçe Dalgalanmaları Ortaya Çıkar Mı?." , ss.728 - 743, 2020.
ISNAD SEN, Sedef. "İleri Demokrasilerde Politik Bütçe Dalgalanmaları Ortaya Çıkar Mı?". (2020), 728-743.
APA SEN S (2020). İleri Demokrasilerde Politik Bütçe Dalgalanmaları Ortaya Çıkar Mı?. Gümüşhane Üniversitesi Sosyal Bilimler Dergisi, 11(3), 728 - 743.
Chicago SEN Sedef İleri Demokrasilerde Politik Bütçe Dalgalanmaları Ortaya Çıkar Mı?. Gümüşhane Üniversitesi Sosyal Bilimler Dergisi 11, no.3 (2020): 728 - 743.
MLA SEN Sedef İleri Demokrasilerde Politik Bütçe Dalgalanmaları Ortaya Çıkar Mı?. Gümüşhane Üniversitesi Sosyal Bilimler Dergisi, vol.11, no.3, 2020, ss.728 - 743.
AMA SEN S İleri Demokrasilerde Politik Bütçe Dalgalanmaları Ortaya Çıkar Mı?. Gümüşhane Üniversitesi Sosyal Bilimler Dergisi. 2020; 11(3): 728 - 743.
Vancouver SEN S İleri Demokrasilerde Politik Bütçe Dalgalanmaları Ortaya Çıkar Mı?. Gümüşhane Üniversitesi Sosyal Bilimler Dergisi. 2020; 11(3): 728 - 743.
IEEE SEN S "İleri Demokrasilerde Politik Bütçe Dalgalanmaları Ortaya Çıkar Mı?." Gümüşhane Üniversitesi Sosyal Bilimler Dergisi, 11, ss.728 - 743, 2020.
ISNAD SEN, Sedef. "İleri Demokrasilerde Politik Bütçe Dalgalanmaları Ortaya Çıkar Mı?". Gümüşhane Üniversitesi Sosyal Bilimler Dergisi 11/3 (2020), 728-743.
Sayfa Oluşturulma Tarihi
23-04-2024 16:48

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