Türkiye and the Future of 
Normalization in the Middle East

Duran, Burhanettin

Türkiye and the Future of Normalization in the Middle East

Burhanettin DURAN (İbn Haldun Üniversitesi, Türkiye)

Insight Turkey

3 1

Yıl: 2022 Cilt: 24 Sayı: 02 Sayfa Aralığı: 161 - 180 Metin Dili: İngilizce İndeks Tarihi: 28-07-2022

Türkiye and the Future of Normalization in the Middle East

Öz:

Following the Arab Spring, all the nations in the Middle East started to pursue a phase of regional softness after a protracted era of strife and rivalry. In many areas of the Middle East, the normalization agenda is being implemented in a coordinated manner based on specific concerns. For a number of reasons, Türkiye has emerged as both a participant in the brand-new normalization process in the Middle East and as a nation making an effort to regulate it. This research article attempts to elaborate on the dynamics of the normalization process ushered in by the Arab Spring and Türkiye’s role in spearheading this process with projected outcomes aimed at long term stability in the region. Overall, the pursuit of normalization is encouraging but not without flaws due to the persistence of ideological differences and conflicts of interest among regional actors and between major international powers.

Anahtar Kelime:

Belge Türü: Makale Makale Türü: Araştırma Makalesi Erişim Türü: Erişime Açık

1. For a study that engages in a multidimensional analysis of ideological, identity and power competition among the regional powers as a rivalry of different models (Saudi, Turkish, Iranian and Egyptian), see, Burhanettin Duran and Nuh Yılmaz, “Ortadoğu’da Modellerin Rekabeti: Arap Baharından Sonra Yeni Güç Dengeleri,” in Burhanettin Duran, Kemal İnat, and Ali Resul Usul (eds.), Türk Dış Politikası Yıllığı 2011, (Ankara: SETA, 2012).
2. The Qatar blockade of 2017 was the most striking example of the strategy of mutuel wearing down that eventually led to a direct attack. Had the blockade succeeded and power changed hands in Doha, that development would have had a notably different impact on the region. Regarding the Qatar blockade, see, Samuel Ramani, “The Qatar Blockade Is Over, but the Gulf Crisis Lives On,” Foreign Policy, (January 2021), retrieved May 28, 2022, from https://foreignpolicy.com/2021/01/27/qatar-blockade-gcc-divisions-turkey-libya-palestine/.
3. Richard Haaas, “The Post-American Middle East,” Project Syndicate, (December 2019), retrieved May 28, 2022, from https://www.project-syndicate.org/commentary/post-american-middle-east-by-richard-n-haass-2019-12.
4. Regarding the U.S. strategy of retrenchment, see, Joseph M. Parent and Paul K. MacDonald, “The Wisdom of Retrenchment: America Must Cut Back to Move Forward,” Foreign Affairs, (November/ December 2011); Thomas Wright, “The Folly of Retrenchment: Why America Can’t Withdraw From the World,” Foreign Affairs, (March/April 2020); Charles A. Kupchan, “America’s Pullback Must Continue No Matter Who Is President,” Foreign Policy, (October 21, 2020).
5. Ufuk Ulutaş and Burhanettin Duran, “Ortadoğu’da Geleneksel Rekabet Mi, Bölgesel Dizayn Mı?” in Kemal İnat, Ali Aslan, Burhanettin Duran (eds.), Kuruluşundan Bugüne AK Parti: Dış Politika, (Ankara: SETA, 2018).
6. On Trump’s decision to recognize Jerusalem as the capital of Israel and reactions to it, see Kadir Üstün and Kılıç B. Kanat, “Trump’s Jerusalem Move,” (Ankara: SETA, 2020).
7. Hussein Ibish, “Wary But Intrigued, Saudi Arabia Is Still Weighing Potential Ties to Israel,” The Arab Gulf States Institute in Washington, (September 2021), retrieved May 28, 2022, from https://agsiw.org/ wary-but-intrigued-saudi-arabia-is-still-weighing-potential-ties-to-israel/; Batu Coşkun, “Birinci Yıldönümünde İbrahim Anlaşmaları: Bölgeyi Nasıl Değiştirdi,” Sabah, (September 2021), retrieved May 28, 2022, from https://www.sabah.com.tr/yazarlar/perspektif/batu-coskun/2021/09/18/birinci-yildonumunde-ibrahim-anlasmalari-bolgeyi-nasil-degistirdi.
8. See, Kemal İnat and Burhanettin Duran, “İran Yaptırımları: Hukuksal Boyut, Bölgesel ve Küresel Yansımalar Türkiye’ye Etkileri,” (Ankara: SETA, 2019).
9. Sayed Zafar Mahdi and Ali Abo Rezeg, “Regional Rivals Iran, Saudi Arabia Looking to Break Ice, Why Now?” Anadolu Agency, (October 2021), retrieved May 28, 2022, from https://www.aa.com.tr/en/analysis/regional-rivals-iran-saudi-arabia-looking-to-break-ice-why-now/2396253.
10. Ghaida Ghantous and Aziz el Yaakoubi, “Stuck in the Middle? UAE Walks Tightrope between U.S, Israel and Iran,” Reuters, (December 2021),retrieved May 28, 2022, from https://www.reuters.com/world/ stuck-middle-uae-walks-tightrope-between-us-israel-iran-2021-12-12/.
11. “Türkiye’den Fanatik Yahudi Grupların Mescid-i Aksa Baskınına Tepki Mesajı,” Anadolu Agency, (May 29, 2022).
12. President Trump unveiled the Abraham Accords at the White House on September 15, 2020, alongside Israel’s Prime Minister, Benjamin Netanyahu, and the Foreign Ministers of the UAE and Bahrain. Sudan and Morocco signed the agreement at a later date, increasing the number of Arab states that recognized Israel without an end to the occupation of Palestinian lands to four. Accordingly, those Arab states began to publicly cooperate with Israel on the security and economic fronts, even though that country had not abandoned its policy of building new settlements. The United States sold new weapons to the UAE, removed Sudan from its list of state sponsors of terrorism, and recognized Morocco’s sovereignty over the Western Sahara in an attempt to encourage normalization between Israel and the Arab states.
13. Zaha Hassan and Marwan Muasher, “Why the Abraham Accords Fall Short,” Foreign Affairs, (June 2022), retrieved June 9, 2022, from https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/2022-06-07/why-abrahamaccords-fall-short.
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15. Gerald M. Feierstein, Bilal Y. Saab, and Karen E. Young, “U.S.-Gulf Relations at the Crossroads: Time for a Recalibration,” Middle East Institute, (April 2022), retrieved May 28, 2022, from https://mei.edu/publications/us-gulf-relations-crossroads-time-recalibration.
16. Jonathan Fenton-Harvey, “6 Months after al-Ula: Has the Gulf Crisis Really Ended?” Anadolu Agency, (July 2021), retrieved from https://www.aa.com.tr/en/analysis/analysis-6-months-after-al-ula-has-thegulf-crisis-really-ended/2295423.
17. “Sheikh Nimr al-Nimr: Saudi Arabia Executes Top Shia Cleric,” BBC, (January 2016), retrieved May 28, 2022, from https://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-35213244.
18. “Houthi Attacks Expose Saudi Arabia’s Defense Weakness,” DW, (March 2022),retrieved May 30, 2022, from https://www.dw.com/en/houthi-attacks-expose-saudi-arabias-defense-weakness/a-61294825.
19. Maziar Motamedi, “Iran, Saudi Arabia Hold Fifth Round of Talks in Baghdad,” Al Jazeera, (April 2022), retrieved May 20, 2022, from https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2022/4/23/iran-and-saudi-arabia-holdstalled-5th-round-of-talks-in-baghdad.
20. Hamdan al-Shehri, “Russia’s Syria Withdrawal a Boon for Iran’s Regional Project,” Arab News, (June 2022), https://www.arabnews.com/node/2096641.
21. Some commentators, who labeled Erdoğan’s proactive foreign policy as Islamist or neo-Ottomanist, portray the policy of normalization as a concession or an admission of failure. Such claims have been refuted by the adaptation of Türkiye’s foreign policy approach to changing circumstances.
22. Burhanettin Duran, “BAE ile Nasıl Yeni bir Sayfa?” Sabah, (November 26, 2021); Amjad Ahmad and Defne Arslan, “Turkey and the UAE Are Getting Close Again. But Why Now?” Atlantic Council, (March 2022), retrieved June 4, 2022, from https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/menasource/turkey-and-theuae-are-getting-close-again-but-why-now/.
23. Çavuşoğlu’s visit related to reviving the joint economic committee, an agreement regarding civil aviation and the development of tourism. The parties postponed the discussion on the appointment of ambassadors, instead exchanging views on resolving the Israel-Palestine question, ensuring the safety of Eastern Mediterranean energy supplies, their delivery to Europe through a joint project, and the most recent developments in Syria. See, Haydar Oruç, “Türkiye-İsrail Normalleşmesinde Yeni Aşama: Çavuşoğlu’nun Ziyareti,” Anadolu Agency, (June 2, 2022).
24. Burhanettin Duran, “Normalleşme Süreci Testlerden Geçiyor,” Sabah, (April 22, 2022).
25. Kristian Coates Ulrichsen, “The Origins of Saudi-Turkey Rapprochement: Is It for Real?” Responsible Statecraft, (June 2022), retrieved June 8, 2022, from https://responsiblestatecraft.org/2022/06/07/ the-origins-of-saudi-turkey-rapprochement/; Burhanettin Duran, “Suudi Arabistan’la Yeni Sayfa,” Sabah, April 30, 2022, https://www.sabah.com.tr/yazarlar/duran/2022/04/30/suudi-arabistanla-yeni-sayfa.
26. Ali Bakir and Eyüp Ersoy, “Saudi-Turkish Reconciliation Is a Cause for Concern in Iran,” Middle East Eye, (May 2022), retrieved June 4, 2022, from https://www.middleeasteye.net/opinion/saudi-arabia-turkey-reconciliation-iran-concern.
27. Burhanettin Duran, “Synchronization Question in Turkey’s Normalization Policy,” Daily Sabah, (May 10, 2022).
28. Burhanettin Duran, “Kahire ile ‘Diplomatik Temas’ ve Yeni Stratejik Değerlendirm,” Sabah, (May 13, 2022), retrieved from https://www.sabah.com.tr/yazarlar/duran/2021/03/13/kahire-ile-diplomatik-temas-ve-yeni-stratejik-degerlendirme
29. For the argument that the U.S. withdrawal from the Middle East will revive sectarian rivalry rather than promote normalization, see, Vali Nasr, “All against All: The Sectarian Resurgence in the Post-American Middle East,” Foreign Affairs, (January 2022), retrieved June 4, 2022, from https://www.foreignaffairs. com/articles/middle-east/2021-12-02/iran-middle-east-all-against-all.

APA	Duran B (2022). Türkiye and the Future of Normalization in the Middle East. , 161 - 180.
Chicago	Duran Burhanettin Türkiye and the Future of Normalization in the Middle East. (2022): 161 - 180.
MLA	Duran Burhanettin Türkiye and the Future of Normalization in the Middle East. , 2022, ss.161 - 180.
AMA	Duran B Türkiye and the Future of Normalization in the Middle East. . 2022; 161 - 180.
Vancouver	Duran B Türkiye and the Future of Normalization in the Middle East. . 2022; 161 - 180.
IEEE	Duran B "Türkiye and the Future of Normalization in the Middle East." , ss.161 - 180, 2022.
ISNAD	Duran, Burhanettin. "Türkiye and the Future of Normalization in the Middle East". (2022), 161-180.

APA	Duran B (2022). Türkiye and the Future of Normalization in the Middle East. Insight Turkey, 24(02), 161 - 180.
Chicago	Duran Burhanettin Türkiye and the Future of Normalization in the Middle East. Insight Turkey 24, no.02 (2022): 161 - 180.
MLA	Duran Burhanettin Türkiye and the Future of Normalization in the Middle East. Insight Turkey, vol.24, no.02, 2022, ss.161 - 180.
AMA	Duran B Türkiye and the Future of Normalization in the Middle East. Insight Turkey. 2022; 24(02): 161 - 180.
Vancouver	Duran B Türkiye and the Future of Normalization in the Middle East. Insight Turkey. 2022; 24(02): 161 - 180.
IEEE	Duran B "Türkiye and the Future of Normalization in the Middle East." Insight Turkey, 24, ss.161 - 180, 2022.
ISNAD	Duran, Burhanettin. "Türkiye and the Future of Normalization in the Middle East". Insight Turkey 24/02 (2022), 161-180.