Digital platforms have become significant for the operation of the global economy, as they bring numerous benefits for consumers and undertakings, but the widespread use of most favored nation (MFN) clauses in e-commerce poses important challenges for policymakers. Ordinarily, such clauses have been implemented in traditional industries; however, the economic dynamics of e-commerce have made these clauses a cornerstone for digital platforms, as they enable platforms to adhere to competitive price guarantees. Unlike traditional MFN clauses, platform MFN clauses, which include restrictions on consumer purchase price, have a significant restrictive impact on the market and are often the subject of complaints from commercial users, such as retailers, restaurants, and hotels. Thus, platform MFN clauses have been the subject of scrutiny by competition authorities in recent years, and under some conditions, these clauses have been found problematic. MFN clauses are examined under narrow and wide headings, and primarily wide MFN clauses (depending on the existence of market power) are prohibited. Nevertheless, narrow MFN clauses are considered legal; however, under certain conditions, narrow MFN clauses may also harm the competitive environment in the market. This is particularly the case for scenarios of high market power of the platform for which the narrow MFN clause is accepted, and the direct channel serves as an important alternative for consumers. This study aims to examine the conditions under which such clauses can pose competition law risks and to distinguish scenarios in which the competition law interference of narrow MFN clauses is likely.