Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī (d. 606/1210) makes a claim in some of his works that "textual evidence gives uncertain information epistemologically". While justifying this claim, which he has expres- sed in many of his works, he mentions some premises. These premises deal with a few asp ects such as the nature of language, its transmission, its use, and what is non -linguistic. One of the most important of these premises is the following proposition about a non-linguistic issue: “There is a possibility that there is rational evidence that is opposed to textual evidence”. In other words, no matter which textual evidence we consider, there is always the possibility of rational evidence expressing its exact opposite. Why should the existence of such a possibility prevent the textual evidence from expressing certain information? We can answer this question as follows: The rele- vant premise is based on the fact that reason and rational evidence give certainty. Namely, in case textual evidence conflicts with rational evidence, either (i) rational evidence is accepted and the textual evidence is rejected, or (ii) textual evidence is accepted and rational evidence is rejected or (iii) both are accepted or ( iv) none is accepted. The last two possibilities are not possible because it is impossible for the contradictions to coexist or be negated at the same time. Since the reason is the origin of the naql and rational evidence gives certainty, textual evidence cannot be accepted and rational evidence cannot be rejected. So, rational evidence is accepted and textual evidence is rejected or interpreted. In order to justify the uncertainty of the textual evidence, whenever Rāzī mentions this premise, he mentions the four possibilities above, and eliminates the other three, except the first, by putting forward the aforementioned reasons, and argues that in such cases there is no option other than the first possibility. As a result, the cer- tainty of the textual evidence disappears. In addition to this discourse, an opposite discourse is attributed to Rāzī regarding the certainty that reason and rational evidence can reach. Some contemporary researchers have also attributed the view that "the reason cannot reach certainty in metaphysics and in the search for truth" by showing some of his statements in the introduction of his work al-Metālib al-Āliye as evidence. If these claims are true, we are faced with an impor- tant problem specific to Rāzī. Because he apparently makes two contradictory judgments about reason and rational evidence. Because, while talking about reason and rational evidence in the context of the uncertainty of textual evidence, Rāzī emphasizes that reason and rational evidence can reach certain information in general without using any recorded expression. Contemporary researchers, on the other hand, attribute the view that "reason and rational evidence cannot reach certain information in metaphysics" to Rāzī without using any recorded expression. In this study, the mentioned problem will be tried to be solved. It will be investigated whether Rāzī really has two opposing discourses about reason and rational evidence. Rāzī's statements about reason and rational evidence can reach certain information while examining the issue of the uncertainty of textual evidence quite clear. But the statements used by contemporary researchers as evidence are not so clear and need analysis. For this reason, to solve the problem, first of all, these unclear statements of Rāzī, which talk about the limitation of reason, will be conveyed and tried to reveal the context in which he expressed them. In addition, it will be shown in which other works of Rāzī these unclear statements are included, which are not mentioned only in the introduction of al- Metālib al-Āliye, and in which context they are. Then, these statements will be analyzed based on the contexts in which they are mentioned. As a result, it will be shown that these statements are valid for some specific issues. In this way, it will be grounded that Razi actually does not have two contradictory statements about reason and rational evidence. Finally, the possible reasons for attributing such a general claim to Rāzī will be mentioned.