This study aims to examine the relationship between Turkiye's energy cooperation in the Caucasus and its attitude towards the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict by tracing Turkiye's changing policies from the 1990s to the 2020s towards the South Caucasus region, which is of great geopolitical, geostrategic and geoeconomic importance. In this study, it is argued that there are three main factors influencing Turkiye's attitude towards the Karabakh Problem during the period between I. and II. the Karabakh Wars: 1) Turkiye’s increasing energy cooperation, especially with Azerbaijan, in the context of its search for new energy alternatives; 2) eliminating the threat elements that may occur in the countries near its border; 3) the desire to increase its influence in the South Caucasus geography, which has the means of transportation to China and Central Asia. The first of these factors is the focus of this study. The main argument of the article is that while Turkiye did not or could not get involved much in Azerbaijan and especially in the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict in the post-Cold War period, its active intervention in the II. Karabakh War largely related to maintaining its energy cooperation in the region (BTC, BTE, TANAP, TAP) and ensuring energy security which can be evaluated within the framework of the liberal interdependence approach. In order for Turkiye to provide its own energy supply security, it needs to show a certain political presence in the South Caucasus, which will enable it to exit in the Caspian Basin and the Central Asian Turkish states, which are rich in energy resources. In the study, it is also claimed that by intervening in the II. Karabakh War, which broke out in 2020 when Turkiye's natural gas imports from Azerbaijan reached the highest rate, Turkiye became more willing to resolve the Karabakh Problem.