In the 21st century, democracies suffer more from centrist political parties that lack intra-party democracy or operate with inadequate conditions than from parties labelled as enemies of democracy. These parties are formally democratic, appeal to the general population and do not have programmes that can be considered marginal, radical or incompatible with democracy. These parties can come to power or be a realistic alternative to power. In terms of voter behaviour, they are perceived as rational choices with these qualities. The absence of intra-party democracy, or the inadequacy of its minimum conditions, does not come under the radar of the mechanisms for the protection of constitutional order and democracy, or of public opinion, when these parties are in opposition. Once in power, however, they may have a legitimate monopoly on state violence. The absence of intra-party democracy makes it impossible for a democratic will to form within the party, allowing the dominance of individuals or groups within the party to be endowed with state power. At this stage, not only the principle of democracy, but also the principle of the rule of law is shaken to its core, and respect for human rights begins to erode. This new phenomenon, observed as the rise of populism, remains unpunished because there is no correlation between competitive democracy and intra- party democracy, or in other words, there is a lack of legal awareness of possible sanctions. The main objective of this study is to demonstrate that the principle of intra-party democracy should be considered within the framework of the proposed system of sanctions for violations of democracy, as it cannot be left without consequences, but rather is a prerequisite for the principle of democracy. It aims to show that the missing link is the combination of legal awareness with the right methodological and dogmatic approach. The study first outlines the framework of the concept of intra-party democracy, followed by an examination of the general landscape of intra-party democracy. These sections emphasise the need for democratic organisation of both the state apparatus and political parties in order to achieve the applicability of the principle of democracy. The relationship between competitive democracy and intra-party democracy is then discussed, followed by an examination of the functionality of the traditional approach to competitive democracy. Choices about institutions and procedures, including the individual and collective freedoms necessary for democratic life, as well as institutional preferences in the realm of political parties and the structuring of the state, determine the fate of democracy. In this regard, the next section discusses whether intra-party democracy constitutes a negative space of freedom, since considering the principle within the framework of the internal freedom of the parties undermines its binding nature and the will of the constitution-maker. Then, the obligations of the legislator, the Constitutional Court, and the political parties for the establishment of intra-party democracy are addressed. In the following section, it is emphasised that the constitutional directive on intra-party democracy is not left to the discretion of the legislator and is not a restriction of fundamental rights. Furthermore, the question of what the minimum conditions of the principle of intra- party democracy are is answered. The final section discusses the issue of sanctions for intra-party democracy in the context of relevant constitutional and legislative provisions, as well as jurisprudential approaches. Under this heading, it is argued that the principle of intra-party democracy is a fundamental component of the principle of democracy and that a violation of intra-party democracy also constitutes a violation of the principle of democracy as set out in the Article 68 §4 of the Constitution and is subject to the prescribed sanction. Furthermore, it is argued that the violation of the principle of intra-party democracy, as it can harm all the values contained in the Article 68 §4 of the Constitution, could legitimise the sanction of dissolution on the grounds of a general violation of the Constitution or be considered by the Constitutional Court as grounds for the termination of legal personality.