The independence of the central bank has recently become a topic of discussion both in Turkey and in the world. In these debates, the independence of central banks is compressed into goal versus instrument independence and when its origins are disputed independence is explained with the power to issue money and the bank’s monopoly on it (seigniorage). Considering that the concepts of central bank independence and the rechtsstaat or the rule of law are frequently used together, this discussion needs to be done in a different way. In this study, central bank independence comes from two branches; in other words, it will be discussed in terms of formation of various supreme boards and financialization trends, which are two related processes. The process of formation of various supreme boards provides a broad perspective in terms of the origin of regulatory boards and can fill the place where the economic function is inadequate in terms of explaining the relationship of the economic function with the independence of the central bank, so that the lack of the financialization literature can be completed. What we want to do is to examine central banks in terms of formation of various supreme boards and governance, and to reveal the transformations created by the relevant processes in central banks, although they are not the direct results of these processes. In conclusion, our aim is to show that central banks can and may be counted as part of formation of various supreme boards and thus as part of modern measures of the rule of law.