A Survey of Strategic Communication and Persuasion

AYÇA ÖZDOĞAN ATABAY (TOBB Ekonomi ve Teknoloji Üniversitesi, Ankara, Türkiye)
Bogazici Journal: Review of Social, Economic and Administrative Studies
1 0
Yıl: 2016 Cilt: 30 Sayı: 1 Sayfa Aralığı: 1 - 21 Metin Dili: Türkçe İndeks Tarihi: 29-07-2022

A Survey of Strategic Communication and Persuasion

Öz:
Bu inceleme çalışması, stratejik iletişim ve ikna etme üzerine detaylı bir literatür taraması sunmaktadır. Araştırmanın amacı literatürdeki farklı yaklaşımların sistematik bir sınıflandırmasını yaparken, her bir kategoride öne çıkan çalışmaları, belirleyici ve öncü makaleleri tartışmaları ile ortaya koymaktır.
Anahtar Kelime:

Konular: İşletme İşletme Finans

Stratejik İletişim ve İkna Üzerine Bir İnceleme

Öz:
This survey paper presents an extended literature review of strategic communication and persuasion. The goal is to provide a systematic categorization of the different approaches in the literature, accompanied with the discussions of the pioneer and leading papers as well as the frontier research in each of the categories.
Anahtar Kelime:

Konular: İşletme İşletme Finans
Belge Türü: Makale Makale Türü: Araştırma Makalesi Erişim Türü: Erişime Açık
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APA ÖZDOĞAN ATABAY A (2016). A Survey of Strategic Communication and Persuasion. , 1 - 21.
Chicago ÖZDOĞAN ATABAY AYÇA A Survey of Strategic Communication and Persuasion. (2016): 1 - 21.
MLA ÖZDOĞAN ATABAY AYÇA A Survey of Strategic Communication and Persuasion. , 2016, ss.1 - 21.
AMA ÖZDOĞAN ATABAY A A Survey of Strategic Communication and Persuasion. . 2016; 1 - 21.
Vancouver ÖZDOĞAN ATABAY A A Survey of Strategic Communication and Persuasion. . 2016; 1 - 21.
IEEE ÖZDOĞAN ATABAY A "A Survey of Strategic Communication and Persuasion." , ss.1 - 21, 2016.
ISNAD ÖZDOĞAN ATABAY, AYÇA. "A Survey of Strategic Communication and Persuasion". (2016), 1-21.
APA ÖZDOĞAN ATABAY A (2016). A Survey of Strategic Communication and Persuasion. Bogazici Journal: Review of Social, Economic and Administrative Studies, 30(1), 1 - 21.
Chicago ÖZDOĞAN ATABAY AYÇA A Survey of Strategic Communication and Persuasion. Bogazici Journal: Review of Social, Economic and Administrative Studies 30, no.1 (2016): 1 - 21.
MLA ÖZDOĞAN ATABAY AYÇA A Survey of Strategic Communication and Persuasion. Bogazici Journal: Review of Social, Economic and Administrative Studies, vol.30, no.1, 2016, ss.1 - 21.
AMA ÖZDOĞAN ATABAY A A Survey of Strategic Communication and Persuasion. Bogazici Journal: Review of Social, Economic and Administrative Studies. 2016; 30(1): 1 - 21.
Vancouver ÖZDOĞAN ATABAY A A Survey of Strategic Communication and Persuasion. Bogazici Journal: Review of Social, Economic and Administrative Studies. 2016; 30(1): 1 - 21.
IEEE ÖZDOĞAN ATABAY A "A Survey of Strategic Communication and Persuasion." Bogazici Journal: Review of Social, Economic and Administrative Studies, 30, ss.1 - 21, 2016.
ISNAD ÖZDOĞAN ATABAY, AYÇA. "A Survey of Strategic Communication and Persuasion". Bogazici Journal: Review of Social, Economic and Administrative Studies 30/1 (2016), 1-21.
Sayfa Oluşturulma Tarihi
17-04-2024 6:34

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