Central bank independence and inﬂation in Africa: The role of Şnancial systems and institutional quality

AGOBA, Abel Mawuko; OSEİ, Kofi A. a a; SA-AADU, Jarjisu; ABOR, Joshua

Central bank independence and inﬂation in Africa: The role of Şnancial systems and institutional quality

Jarjisu SA-AADU, (b University of Iowa, USA)

Kofi A. a a OSEİ, (a University of Ghana, Ghana)

Joshua ABOR, (a University of Ghana, Ghana)

Abel Mawuko AGOBA (a University of Ghana, Ghana)

Central Bank Review

2 1

Yıl: 2017 Cilt: 17 Sayı: 4 Sayfa Aralığı: 131 - 146 Metin Dili: İngilizce İndeks Tarihi: 29-07-2022

Central bank independence and inﬂation in Africa: The role of Şnancial systems and institutional quality

Öz:

The study examines the effects ofŞnancial systems and the quality of political institutions on theeffectiveness of central bank independence in achieving lower inﬂation. Drawing from the Şscal theoryof price level (FTPL) and political economy of macroeconomic policy (PEMP) literature; we estimate apanel regression model, using Two Stage Least Squares instrumental variables procedure, on a sample of48 African countries over the period 1970e2012. The study Şnds that central bank independenceinﬂation nexus is dependent on the model, sample and estimation technique used. After accountingfor various control variables and introducing inﬂation targeting as an additional explanatory variable, thestudy shows that, unlike in developed countries, CBI is not sufŞcient in achieving lower inﬂation in Africaand the developing world. However, common to developed, developing and African countries, is that,higher central bank independence is more effective in lowering inﬂation in the presence of high levels ofbanking sector development and institutional quality. TheŞndings of the study also show that whilestock market development enhances the effectiveness of CBI in developed and developing countries, ithas no signiŞcant effect on CBI effectiveness in Africa.© 2017 Central Bank of The Republic of Turkey. Production and hosting by Elsevier B.V. This is an openaccess article under the CC BY-NC-ND license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/)

Anahtar Kelime:

Konular: İşletme İktisat

Belge Türü: Makale Makale Türü: Araştırma Makalesi Erişim Türü: Erişime Açık

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APA	SA-AADU J, OSEİ K, ABOR J, AGOBA A (2017). Central bank independence and inﬂation in Africa: The role of Şnancial systems and institutional quality. , 131 - 146.
Chicago	SA-AADU Jarjisu,OSEİ Kofi A. a a,ABOR Joshua,AGOBA Abel Mawuko Central bank independence and inﬂation in Africa: The role of Şnancial systems and institutional quality. (2017): 131 - 146.
MLA	SA-AADU Jarjisu,OSEİ Kofi A. a a,ABOR Joshua,AGOBA Abel Mawuko Central bank independence and inﬂation in Africa: The role of Şnancial systems and institutional quality. , 2017, ss.131 - 146.
AMA	SA-AADU J,OSEİ K,ABOR J,AGOBA A Central bank independence and inﬂation in Africa: The role of Şnancial systems and institutional quality. . 2017; 131 - 146.
Vancouver	SA-AADU J,OSEİ K,ABOR J,AGOBA A Central bank independence and inﬂation in Africa: The role of Şnancial systems and institutional quality. . 2017; 131 - 146.
IEEE	SA-AADU J,OSEİ K,ABOR J,AGOBA A "Central bank independence and inﬂation in Africa: The role of Şnancial systems and institutional quality." , ss.131 - 146, 2017.
ISNAD	SA-AADU, Jarjisu vd. "Central bank independence and inﬂation in Africa: The role of Şnancial systems and institutional quality". (2017), 131-146.

APA	SA-AADU J, OSEİ K, ABOR J, AGOBA A (2017). Central bank independence and inﬂation in Africa: The role of Şnancial systems and institutional quality. Central Bank Review, 17(4), 131 - 146.
Chicago	SA-AADU Jarjisu,OSEİ Kofi A. a a,ABOR Joshua,AGOBA Abel Mawuko Central bank independence and inﬂation in Africa: The role of Şnancial systems and institutional quality. Central Bank Review 17, no.4 (2017): 131 - 146.
MLA	SA-AADU Jarjisu,OSEİ Kofi A. a a,ABOR Joshua,AGOBA Abel Mawuko Central bank independence and inﬂation in Africa: The role of Şnancial systems and institutional quality. Central Bank Review, vol.17, no.4, 2017, ss.131 - 146.
AMA	SA-AADU J,OSEİ K,ABOR J,AGOBA A Central bank independence and inﬂation in Africa: The role of Şnancial systems and institutional quality. Central Bank Review. 2017; 17(4): 131 - 146.
Vancouver	SA-AADU J,OSEİ K,ABOR J,AGOBA A Central bank independence and inﬂation in Africa: The role of Şnancial systems and institutional quality. Central Bank Review. 2017; 17(4): 131 - 146.
IEEE	SA-AADU J,OSEİ K,ABOR J,AGOBA A "Central bank independence and inﬂation in Africa: The role of Şnancial systems and institutional quality." Central Bank Review, 17, ss.131 - 146, 2017.
ISNAD	SA-AADU, Jarjisu vd. "Central bank independence and inﬂation in Africa: The role of Şnancial systems and institutional quality". Central Bank Review 17/4 (2017), 131-146.