Islamism has come out since 19th century and formed in three branches in the world namely “Muslim Brother”s in Arabic Peninsula, “Cemaat-iIslami” in Indian subcontinent and Anatolian Islamism. Anatolian Islamism, which became visible firstly by Ottoman Islamists, became active at the backstage for a while after the proclamation of the republic. After NecmettinErbakan had become independent member of the parliament from Konya in 1969, he started to organize “MilliGörüş” and then it became official. Unlike many Islamic formations which are active in Turkey, the most important feature of “MilliGörüş” is that it hasn’t involved in violence, even during the times when social violence were very intense or during the time when Islamic agenda became activist with Iran revolution, and it came into power by staying at democratic system. MilliGörüş which didn’t change his attitude, even though four of his political parties (National Order Party, National Salvation Party, Welfare Party, Virtue Party) were closed, has an important role and has a feature of being a distinguished laboratory in all of the Islamic formations. Starting out from the theoretical framework of religious radicalism, the main argument of this study is that, if Islamic political perspective is led properly it won’t bring radicalism and “MilliGörüş” can be shown as a sample. With in this context, the reasons behind the radicalization of “MilliGörüş” will be studied in four main points. The reasons generating from the Turkey’s typical conditions are the factor of leadership and the approach of perception of Islam, organization and the lastly MilliGörüş’s ideological data. Within the content of the study starting out from these four main points, by putting forward the differences of MilliGörüş from the other Islamist/Islamic formation, it is aimed to reach objective outcomes to prevent religious radicalism Although there is no commonly accepted definition in the literature,to express the adoption of a more or less coherent system of thinking andan anticipation of the future imitation and the use of force and / orviolence as a method for dealing with at least one area of opposition to atleast one area of common accepted norms in social, political andeconomic spheres" . In other words, it can be defined as radicalism byopposing the existing one and trying to place a new order through the useof force and / or violence. To make a conceptual distinction, the state ofbeing opposed to a mainstream social, political, and economic currentmust be defined by the concept of extremism instead of radicalism. It alsoemerges as the first step in the production of radicalism. When extremismis accompanied by political or social activism, a distinction is madebetween radicalism and activism. Radicalism is activism, which is the next or simultaneous step that produces violence or tends to produceviolence. However, it is unlikely that every activism will necessarily turninto radicalism. Since radicalism is inherently system oriented, the useof violence or force produced by it is also system-oriented, so it does notlead to civilians, nor is it systematic or persistent. When radicalismbegins to practice violence against civilians, it turns into terrorism. Inthis context, terrorism is the next phase in which radicalism producessystematic and persistent violence against both the state and thecivilians. However, it should be noted again; Every radicalism can not beexpected to evolve into terrorism.Religious radicalism can be defined as a form of radicalism thatlegitimizes a conviction system as criticism of system dynamics throughpolitical arguments and to legitimize use of violence and / or power as amethod - whether preaching a belief system or not - through religiousarguments, planning to make a faith-based change in the present system.In fact, the factors that could lead to religious radicalism have six mainreasons:1. Political environment: a) The dissatisfaction created by secularor pro-Western governments for Muslims and the upset of public policiesand politics produced by these administrations failing to meet religiousexpectations: "The state does not allow religious life!" b) Lack of politicalrepresentation and inability or lack of political mechanisms that willtransmit demands to the political arena: "I am not represented!" c)Inability or legal barriers for creating non-governmental organizations: "Ican not express myself!" d) The limitation or absence of freedom ofreligion, or the state pressures on the freedom of religion: "I can not pray!"2. Individual status: a) The quest for identity: "I exist with mybelief, for what I believe, as long as I believe!" b) Individual weakness asan : "I am strong with believers like me!" c) Prove yourself: "I am ready formy beliefs!" d) Socio-economic deprivation and inadequate education:"because of you!"3. Religious political goals a) Religious transformation practicein political structure: "The state for my belief, absolutely!" b) Defeat thewest: "Now, it’s our turn!" c) Realizing the goal of politicized beliefs suchas Promised Land or Golden Age of Islam:"my belief is my future!" d)Religious literal interpretation: "Each writing is an order!"4. Social reasons: a) Being differentiated or excluded: "I am here!"b) Unable to adapt to the majority: "I do not believe that!" c) Immigrationand integration problems: "My belief is good, but it’s up to you!"5. Philosophical Causes a) Reaction to modernity and itsinstitutions: “sole truth is my belief!" b) Globalization: "we are biggernow!"In the radicalization that began with the combination of a few ofthese causes, the individual is accusing external factors as a source ofproblems, and is now making a strong judgment that the in-systemmeans do not work to destroy them. When these factors disappear, thesuggestion of establishing a believed / promised future