Keeping Up Appearances: The Importance of Reputation in State - Group Relations

Yıl: 2019 Cilt: 13 Sayı: 25 Sayfa Aralığı: 79 - 101 Metin Dili: İngilizce İndeks Tarihi: 02-04-2020

Keeping Up Appearances: The Importance of Reputation in State - Group Relations

Öz:
Over the past thirty years we observed a shift in conflict patterns where asymmetric conflicts increasingly became the norm. Building on the previous work on decision-making in asymmetric conflicts, this study compares two dominant hypotheses in the field, namely the reputation hypothesis and the capacity/interest hypothesis, regarding adversaries’ conflict behavior in asymmetric conflicts. I argue that the reputation hypothesis is more useful than its bad track record in interstate conflicts suggests. I also contend that a single hypothesis is insufficient in explaining the decision-making behavior in asymmetric conflicts. In such conflicts, the uneven nature of power/status distribution between the actors leads them to have dissimilar goals and adopt different strategies. As a result, different hypotheses may be applicable to different actors. More specifically, the state as the more powerful of the two needs to protect its reputation in order to discourage any present and future challenges. The group, on the other hand, is often the weaker actor and its choices and strategies are limited by the availability of resources. This pushes them to behave according to capacity/interest hypothesis.
Anahtar Kelime:

Konular: Tarih Siyasi Bilimler Uluslararası İlişkiler

Görünüşü Kurtarmak: Devlet-Grup İlişkilerinde İtibarın Önemi

Öz:
Geçtiğimiz otuz yılda çatışma modellerinde asimetrik çatışmaların giderek artan bir biçimde norm haline geldiği bir değişime şahit olduk. Bu çalışma asimetrik çatışmalarda karar alma sürecine ilişkin önceki çalışmalara dayanarak, tarafların çatışma davranışlarını alandaki iki egemen görüşü, yani itibar hipotezi ve kapasite/çıkar hipotezini karşılaştırarak ele almaktadır. İtibar hipotezinin, devletlerarası çatışmalarda, geçmişteki kötü performansından daha faydalı olduğunu ileri sürerken, asimetrik çatışmalarda karar alma sürecinin açıklanmasında tek bir hipotezin yeterli olmayacağı görüşündeyim. Bu tür çatışmalarda aktörler arasında güç ve statü dağılımındaki olağan eşitsizlik, onların farklı hedeflere sahip olmasına ve farklı stratejileri benimsemesine neden olmuştur. Sonuç olarak, farklı aktörlere farklı hipotezler uygulanabilir. Özellikle, taraflardan daha güçlü olan devlet, halihazırdaki ve gelecek tehditlere karşı itibarını korumayı hedefler. Öte yandan, karşı grup genellikle daha zayıf olan taraftır ve tercih ve stratejileri erişebildiği kaynaklar ile sınırlandırılmıştır. Bu durum onların kapasite/çıkar hipotezine göre hareket etmeye itmektedir.
Anahtar Kelime:

Konular: Tarih Siyasi Bilimler Uluslararası İlişkiler
Belge Türü: Makale Makale Türü: Araştırma Makalesi Erişim Türü: Erişime Açık
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APA TURAN K (2019). Keeping Up Appearances: The Importance of Reputation in State - Group Relations. , 79 - 101.
Chicago TURAN Kürşad Keeping Up Appearances: The Importance of Reputation in State - Group Relations. (2019): 79 - 101.
MLA TURAN Kürşad Keeping Up Appearances: The Importance of Reputation in State - Group Relations. , 2019, ss.79 - 101.
AMA TURAN K Keeping Up Appearances: The Importance of Reputation in State - Group Relations. . 2019; 79 - 101.
Vancouver TURAN K Keeping Up Appearances: The Importance of Reputation in State - Group Relations. . 2019; 79 - 101.
IEEE TURAN K "Keeping Up Appearances: The Importance of Reputation in State - Group Relations." , ss.79 - 101, 2019.
ISNAD TURAN, Kürşad. "Keeping Up Appearances: The Importance of Reputation in State - Group Relations". (2019), 79-101.
APA TURAN K (2019). Keeping Up Appearances: The Importance of Reputation in State - Group Relations. Gazi Akademik Bakış, 13(25), 79 - 101.
Chicago TURAN Kürşad Keeping Up Appearances: The Importance of Reputation in State - Group Relations. Gazi Akademik Bakış 13, no.25 (2019): 79 - 101.
MLA TURAN Kürşad Keeping Up Appearances: The Importance of Reputation in State - Group Relations. Gazi Akademik Bakış, vol.13, no.25, 2019, ss.79 - 101.
AMA TURAN K Keeping Up Appearances: The Importance of Reputation in State - Group Relations. Gazi Akademik Bakış. 2019; 13(25): 79 - 101.
Vancouver TURAN K Keeping Up Appearances: The Importance of Reputation in State - Group Relations. Gazi Akademik Bakış. 2019; 13(25): 79 - 101.
IEEE TURAN K "Keeping Up Appearances: The Importance of Reputation in State - Group Relations." Gazi Akademik Bakış, 13, ss.79 - 101, 2019.
ISNAD TURAN, Kürşad. "Keeping Up Appearances: The Importance of Reputation in State - Group Relations". Gazi Akademik Bakış 13/25 (2019), 79-101.