Yıl: 2018 Cilt: 5 Sayı: 2 Sayfa Aralığı: 13 - 35 Metin Dili: İngilizce DOI: 10.26513/tocd.466046 İndeks Tarihi: 16-09-2020

Turkey’s Syria Policy: Constant Objectives, Shifting Priorities

Öz:
Turkey’s foreign policy approach started to transform from a more liberal andhumanitarian foreign policy to a more realistic and pragmatic one in 2016, whichwas manifested in the Syrian civil war. In this period, Turkey started to prioritizethe use of hard power in order to prevent the threats resulting from the civilwar. This paper asserts that while Turkey’s objectives in the Syrian crisis haveremained stable, its priorities have changed especially in recent years. So, whilefrom 2011-2016 humanitarian norms dominated Turkey’s Syria policy, after 2016,these norms became secondary priorities, and were replaced by hard power-basedmilitary assertiveness. To support this hypothesis, six main objectives of Turkey’sforeign policy are taken into consideration: Managing the humanitarian crisis,materializing the fall of the Assad regime, aiding the opposition forces, waginga proxy war with Iran, eliminating the threat of Daesh, and preventing the PYD/YPG from creating an area of dominance.
Anahtar Kelime:

Türkiye’nin Suriye Politikası: Değişmeyen Hedefler, Değişen Öncelikler

Öz:
Türkiye’nin dış politika yaklaşımı, 2016 yılında liberal bir çerçeveden ayrılarak realist bir anlayışa sahip olmuştur. Bu değişimin en net göstergesi ise Suriye iç savaşıdır. Zira Türkiye, Suriye iç savaşından kaynaklı tehditleri önlemek amacıyla askeri güç kullanımını öncelemiştir. Bu makale, Suriye krizi karşısında Türkiye’nin hedeflerinin sabit kaldığını ancak son yıllarda önceliklerinin değiştiğini iddia etmektedir. Nitekim 2011-2016 yılları arasında insani normlar Türkiye’nin Suriye politikasını belirlerken, 2016 yılı sonrasında bu normlar ikincil öncelikler olmuş ve sert güç odaklı askeri operasyonlarla yer değiştirmiştir. Makale bu varsayımı desteklemek amacıyla Suriye krizine karşı Türk Dış Politikası’nın altı temel amacını merkeze almıştır. Bu amaçlar sırasıyla; Suriye’de ortaya çıkan insani krizi yönetmek, Esed Rejimi’nin yıkılması, muhalefet güçlerine destek, İran ile yapılan vekalet savaşı, DAEŞ tehdidini yok etmek ve PYD/YPG’nin hakimiyet alanı kurmasının engellenmesidir.
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Belge Türü: Makale Makale Türü: Araştırma Makalesi Erişim Türü: Erişime Açık
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APA ATAMAN M, Özdemir Ç (2018). Turkey’s Syria Policy: Constant Objectives, Shifting Priorities. , 13 - 35. 10.26513/tocd.466046
Chicago ATAMAN Muhittin,Özdemir Çağatay Turkey’s Syria Policy: Constant Objectives, Shifting Priorities. (2018): 13 - 35. 10.26513/tocd.466046
MLA ATAMAN Muhittin,Özdemir Çağatay Turkey’s Syria Policy: Constant Objectives, Shifting Priorities. , 2018, ss.13 - 35. 10.26513/tocd.466046
AMA ATAMAN M,Özdemir Ç Turkey’s Syria Policy: Constant Objectives, Shifting Priorities. . 2018; 13 - 35. 10.26513/tocd.466046
Vancouver ATAMAN M,Özdemir Ç Turkey’s Syria Policy: Constant Objectives, Shifting Priorities. . 2018; 13 - 35. 10.26513/tocd.466046
IEEE ATAMAN M,Özdemir Ç "Turkey’s Syria Policy: Constant Objectives, Shifting Priorities." , ss.13 - 35, 2018. 10.26513/tocd.466046
ISNAD ATAMAN, Muhittin - Özdemir, Çağatay. "Turkey’s Syria Policy: Constant Objectives, Shifting Priorities". (2018), 13-35. https://doi.org/10.26513/tocd.466046
APA ATAMAN M, Özdemir Ç (2018). Turkey’s Syria Policy: Constant Objectives, Shifting Priorities. Türkiye Ortadoğu Çalışmaları Dergisi, 5(2), 13 - 35. 10.26513/tocd.466046
Chicago ATAMAN Muhittin,Özdemir Çağatay Turkey’s Syria Policy: Constant Objectives, Shifting Priorities. Türkiye Ortadoğu Çalışmaları Dergisi 5, no.2 (2018): 13 - 35. 10.26513/tocd.466046
MLA ATAMAN Muhittin,Özdemir Çağatay Turkey’s Syria Policy: Constant Objectives, Shifting Priorities. Türkiye Ortadoğu Çalışmaları Dergisi, vol.5, no.2, 2018, ss.13 - 35. 10.26513/tocd.466046
AMA ATAMAN M,Özdemir Ç Turkey’s Syria Policy: Constant Objectives, Shifting Priorities. Türkiye Ortadoğu Çalışmaları Dergisi. 2018; 5(2): 13 - 35. 10.26513/tocd.466046
Vancouver ATAMAN M,Özdemir Ç Turkey’s Syria Policy: Constant Objectives, Shifting Priorities. Türkiye Ortadoğu Çalışmaları Dergisi. 2018; 5(2): 13 - 35. 10.26513/tocd.466046
IEEE ATAMAN M,Özdemir Ç "Turkey’s Syria Policy: Constant Objectives, Shifting Priorities." Türkiye Ortadoğu Çalışmaları Dergisi, 5, ss.13 - 35, 2018. 10.26513/tocd.466046
ISNAD ATAMAN, Muhittin - Özdemir, Çağatay. "Turkey’s Syria Policy: Constant Objectives, Shifting Priorities". Türkiye Ortadoğu Çalışmaları Dergisi 5/2 (2018), 13-35. https://doi.org/10.26513/tocd.466046