TY  - JOUR
TI  - Converse Tournaments
AB  - This paper proposes two alternatives to Clark andRiis (1998b)’s sequential model of nested multipleprize contests. First, we consider winning prizesendogenously determined by exerted contestefforts. Second, we extend the model to infinitehorizon. We characterize the unique subgameperfect Nash equilibrium in both models andcompare the equilibrium strategies with those inthe original model.
AU  - Keskin, Kerim
DO  - 10.21121/eab.2019148773
PY  - 2019
JO  - Ege Akademik Bakış
VL  - 19
IS  - 1
SN  - 1303-099X
SP  - 33
EP  - 43
DB  - TRDizin
UR  - http://search/yayin/detay/388096
ER  -