Russia is Back to the Balancing Game

Samet YÜCE, (Sakarya Üniversitesi, Orta Doğu Enstitüsü (ORMER), Sakarya, Türkiye)
Philipp O. AMOUR (Sakarya Üniversitesi, Uluslararası İlişkiler Bölümü, Sakarya, Türkiye)
Gazi Akademik Bakış
7 1
Yıl: 2021 Cilt: 14 Sayı: 28 Sayfa Aralığı: 43 - 66 Metin Dili: İngilizce İndeks Tarihi: 24-11-2021

Russia is Back to the Balancing Game

Öz:
This research mainly aims to show the balancing game of Russia in Syria and Libya after the Arab Spring. RecentlyRussia has increased its influence in Syria and Libya by its own capabilities and alliances with regional and localactors. Thus, it sought to consolidate its strength and balance its rivals, predominantly the US, in the internationalsystem. After the Arab Spring, Russia deployed its military muscle to Syria to protect its traditional ally the Bashar al-Assadregime, and restrain the US from solely dominating the region. Its attempts achieved to ensure the regime’s survivaland balance the US in the country. Later, it sought to expand its sphere of influence and balance the rivals in Libya.It primarily used its own capabilities and alliance relations with the Khalifa Haftar group, the UAE, and Egypt.Russia’s growing presence in Libya inevitably affected the regional competition and balance of power among thestates. However, the clashes among the militias supported by the external powers escalated in the fragmented country.Eventually, the UN-recognized GNA consolidated its power against the Khalifa Haftar forces and seized the controlof northwest Libya, but an unstable environment still prevails in the country.
Anahtar Kelime:

Rusya’nın Dengeleme Oyununa Dönüşü

Öz:
Bu araştırma temelde Arap Baharı sonrası Suriye ve Libya’da Rusya’nın yürüttüğü dengeleme oyununu gös termeyi amaçlamaktadır. Son zamanlarda Rusya bölgesel ve lokal aktörlerle ittifak ilişkileri kurarak Suriye veLibya’daki nufuzunu arttırmıştır.Böylece başta ABD olmak üzere rakiplerini dengelemeye ve gücünü konsolideetmeye çalışmıştır. Arap Baharı sonrasında, Rusya ABD’nin tek başına bölgeyi domine etmesini engellemek ve geleneksel müttefikiBeşar Esed rejimini korumak adına askeri gücünü Suriye’ye gönderdi. Rusya çabalarıyla ABD’yi dengelemeyi veEsed rejiminin hayatta kalmasını sağlamayı başardı. Daha sonra Libya’da nufuz alanını genişletmek ve rakiplerinidengelemek istedi. Esasen kendi imkanlarının yanısıra Mısır, Birleşik Arab Emirlikleri ve Halife Haftar grubuylakurduğu itttifak ilişkilerini kullandı. Rusya’nın Libya’da artan varlığı kaçınılmaz olarak devletlerarası güç denge sini ve bölgesel rekabeti etkilemiştir. Ancak, parçalanmış olan ülkede dış güçlerin desteklediği milisler arasındakiçatışmalar kızışmıştır. Sonunda Birleşmiş Milletlerin tanıdığı Libya Ulusal Mutabakat Hükümeti (LUMH), HalifeHaftar grubu karşısında güçünü konsolide etmiş ve kuzeybatı Libya’nın kontrolünü ele almışsa da istikrarsız ortamhala ülkede hüküm sürmektedir.
Anahtar Kelime:

Belge Türü: Makale Makale Türü: Araştırma Makalesi Erişim Türü: Erişime Açık
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APA YÜCE S, Amour P (2021). Russia is Back to the Balancing Game. , 43 - 66.
Chicago YÜCE SAMET,Amour Philipp O. Russia is Back to the Balancing Game. (2021): 43 - 66.
MLA YÜCE SAMET,Amour Philipp O. Russia is Back to the Balancing Game. , 2021, ss.43 - 66.
AMA YÜCE S,Amour P Russia is Back to the Balancing Game. . 2021; 43 - 66.
Vancouver YÜCE S,Amour P Russia is Back to the Balancing Game. . 2021; 43 - 66.
IEEE YÜCE S,Amour P "Russia is Back to the Balancing Game." , ss.43 - 66, 2021.
ISNAD YÜCE, SAMET - Amour, Philipp O.. "Russia is Back to the Balancing Game". (2021), 43-66.
APA YÜCE S, Amour P (2021). Russia is Back to the Balancing Game. Gazi Akademik Bakış, 14(28), 43 - 66.
Chicago YÜCE SAMET,Amour Philipp O. Russia is Back to the Balancing Game. Gazi Akademik Bakış 14, no.28 (2021): 43 - 66.
MLA YÜCE SAMET,Amour Philipp O. Russia is Back to the Balancing Game. Gazi Akademik Bakış, vol.14, no.28, 2021, ss.43 - 66.
AMA YÜCE S,Amour P Russia is Back to the Balancing Game. Gazi Akademik Bakış. 2021; 14(28): 43 - 66.
Vancouver YÜCE S,Amour P Russia is Back to the Balancing Game. Gazi Akademik Bakış. 2021; 14(28): 43 - 66.
IEEE YÜCE S,Amour P "Russia is Back to the Balancing Game." Gazi Akademik Bakış, 14, ss.43 - 66, 2021.
ISNAD YÜCE, SAMET - Amour, Philipp O.. "Russia is Back to the Balancing Game". Gazi Akademik Bakış 14/28 (2021), 43-66.
Sayfa Oluşturulma Tarihi
23-04-2024 20:17

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