TurkStream as Russia’s Last Step inDiversification: A Win-Win Approach

Yıl: 2021 Cilt: 23 Sayı: 01 Sayfa Aralığı: 205 - 224 Metin Dili: İngilizce DOI: 10.25253/99.2021231.13 İndeks Tarihi: 02-12-2021

TurkStream as Russia’s Last Step inDiversification: A Win-Win Approach

Öz:
This article discusses why Russia replaced the South Stream projectwith the TurkStream by changing its route and name, and why Turkey isinvolved in a project on the North-South line although it plays a vital rolein the Trans-Anatolia Natural Gas Pipeline (TANAP) project in the south ern gas corridor. The article first examines the Russia-Ukraine natural gascrisis. It then moves to analyze the reasons behind Russia’s changing ofthe name and the route of the South Stream project. After exploring Tur key’s involvement in the project, the article concludes by arguing that bothcountries adopted a win-win approach toward the project that Russia hasgained a significant tariff advantage and freedom from the EU third-par ty-access rule. The article claims that although both Russia and Turkeyhave different perspectives on some issues in international politics, theycan develop their cooperation with a win-win approach in the TurkStreamproject.
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Belge Türü: Makale Makale Türü: Araştırma Makalesi Erişim Türü: Erişime Açık
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APA ERDAĞ R (2021). TurkStream as Russia’s Last Step inDiversification: A Win-Win Approach. , 205 - 224. 10.25253/99.2021231.13
Chicago ERDAĞ Ramazan TurkStream as Russia’s Last Step inDiversification: A Win-Win Approach. (2021): 205 - 224. 10.25253/99.2021231.13
MLA ERDAĞ Ramazan TurkStream as Russia’s Last Step inDiversification: A Win-Win Approach. , 2021, ss.205 - 224. 10.25253/99.2021231.13
AMA ERDAĞ R TurkStream as Russia’s Last Step inDiversification: A Win-Win Approach. . 2021; 205 - 224. 10.25253/99.2021231.13
Vancouver ERDAĞ R TurkStream as Russia’s Last Step inDiversification: A Win-Win Approach. . 2021; 205 - 224. 10.25253/99.2021231.13
IEEE ERDAĞ R "TurkStream as Russia’s Last Step inDiversification: A Win-Win Approach." , ss.205 - 224, 2021. 10.25253/99.2021231.13
ISNAD ERDAĞ, Ramazan. "TurkStream as Russia’s Last Step inDiversification: A Win-Win Approach". (2021), 205-224. https://doi.org/10.25253/99.2021231.13
APA ERDAĞ R (2021). TurkStream as Russia’s Last Step inDiversification: A Win-Win Approach. Insight Turkey, 23(01), 205 - 224. 10.25253/99.2021231.13
Chicago ERDAĞ Ramazan TurkStream as Russia’s Last Step inDiversification: A Win-Win Approach. Insight Turkey 23, no.01 (2021): 205 - 224. 10.25253/99.2021231.13
MLA ERDAĞ Ramazan TurkStream as Russia’s Last Step inDiversification: A Win-Win Approach. Insight Turkey, vol.23, no.01, 2021, ss.205 - 224. 10.25253/99.2021231.13
AMA ERDAĞ R TurkStream as Russia’s Last Step inDiversification: A Win-Win Approach. Insight Turkey. 2021; 23(01): 205 - 224. 10.25253/99.2021231.13
Vancouver ERDAĞ R TurkStream as Russia’s Last Step inDiversification: A Win-Win Approach. Insight Turkey. 2021; 23(01): 205 - 224. 10.25253/99.2021231.13
IEEE ERDAĞ R "TurkStream as Russia’s Last Step inDiversification: A Win-Win Approach." Insight Turkey, 23, ss.205 - 224, 2021. 10.25253/99.2021231.13
ISNAD ERDAĞ, Ramazan. "TurkStream as Russia’s Last Step inDiversification: A Win-Win Approach". Insight Turkey 23/01 (2021), 205-224. https://doi.org/10.25253/99.2021231.13