Syrian Mass Migration in the 2015 EU Refugee Crisis: A Hybrid Threat or Chance for Implementing Migration Diplomacy?

Yıl: 2021 Cilt: 23 Sayı: 02 Sayfa Aralığı: 235 - 258 Metin Dili: İngilizce DOI: 10.25253/99.2021232.13 İndeks Tarihi: 12-12-2021

Syrian Mass Migration in the 2015 EU Refugee Crisis: A Hybrid Threat or Chance for Implementing Migration Diplomacy?

Öz:
This article examines the use of coercive engineered migration as a hybrid threat during the 2015 EU refugee crisis. The authors argue that coercive engineered migration can be used as a threat by a state, even when it is not the source of outflows; that it is possible under conditions of an internal or external conflict in the state that is the source of migration; that a state-challenger would most probably be an authoritarian state that supports the government of the emigration state. The authors state that the sound action for Turkey and the EU in the conditions of a crisis that of 2015, would be to develop a migration diplomacy initiative that could contribute not only to a deal but to a sustainable, mutually beneficial solution for both parties.
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APA İrdem İ, Raychev Y (2021). Syrian Mass Migration in the 2015 EU Refugee Crisis: A Hybrid Threat or Chance for Implementing Migration Diplomacy?. , 235 - 258. 10.25253/99.2021232.13
Chicago İrdem İbrahim,Raychev Yavor Syrian Mass Migration in the 2015 EU Refugee Crisis: A Hybrid Threat or Chance for Implementing Migration Diplomacy?. (2021): 235 - 258. 10.25253/99.2021232.13
MLA İrdem İbrahim,Raychev Yavor Syrian Mass Migration in the 2015 EU Refugee Crisis: A Hybrid Threat or Chance for Implementing Migration Diplomacy?. , 2021, ss.235 - 258. 10.25253/99.2021232.13
AMA İrdem İ,Raychev Y Syrian Mass Migration in the 2015 EU Refugee Crisis: A Hybrid Threat or Chance for Implementing Migration Diplomacy?. . 2021; 235 - 258. 10.25253/99.2021232.13
Vancouver İrdem İ,Raychev Y Syrian Mass Migration in the 2015 EU Refugee Crisis: A Hybrid Threat or Chance for Implementing Migration Diplomacy?. . 2021; 235 - 258. 10.25253/99.2021232.13
IEEE İrdem İ,Raychev Y "Syrian Mass Migration in the 2015 EU Refugee Crisis: A Hybrid Threat or Chance for Implementing Migration Diplomacy?." , ss.235 - 258, 2021. 10.25253/99.2021232.13
ISNAD İrdem, İbrahim - Raychev, Yavor. "Syrian Mass Migration in the 2015 EU Refugee Crisis: A Hybrid Threat or Chance for Implementing Migration Diplomacy?". (2021), 235-258. https://doi.org/10.25253/99.2021232.13
APA İrdem İ, Raychev Y (2021). Syrian Mass Migration in the 2015 EU Refugee Crisis: A Hybrid Threat or Chance for Implementing Migration Diplomacy?. Insight Turkey, 23(02), 235 - 258. 10.25253/99.2021232.13
Chicago İrdem İbrahim,Raychev Yavor Syrian Mass Migration in the 2015 EU Refugee Crisis: A Hybrid Threat or Chance for Implementing Migration Diplomacy?. Insight Turkey 23, no.02 (2021): 235 - 258. 10.25253/99.2021232.13
MLA İrdem İbrahim,Raychev Yavor Syrian Mass Migration in the 2015 EU Refugee Crisis: A Hybrid Threat or Chance for Implementing Migration Diplomacy?. Insight Turkey, vol.23, no.02, 2021, ss.235 - 258. 10.25253/99.2021232.13
AMA İrdem İ,Raychev Y Syrian Mass Migration in the 2015 EU Refugee Crisis: A Hybrid Threat or Chance for Implementing Migration Diplomacy?. Insight Turkey. 2021; 23(02): 235 - 258. 10.25253/99.2021232.13
Vancouver İrdem İ,Raychev Y Syrian Mass Migration in the 2015 EU Refugee Crisis: A Hybrid Threat or Chance for Implementing Migration Diplomacy?. Insight Turkey. 2021; 23(02): 235 - 258. 10.25253/99.2021232.13
IEEE İrdem İ,Raychev Y "Syrian Mass Migration in the 2015 EU Refugee Crisis: A Hybrid Threat or Chance for Implementing Migration Diplomacy?." Insight Turkey, 23, ss.235 - 258, 2021. 10.25253/99.2021232.13
ISNAD İrdem, İbrahim - Raychev, Yavor. "Syrian Mass Migration in the 2015 EU Refugee Crisis: A Hybrid Threat or Chance for Implementing Migration Diplomacy?". Insight Turkey 23/02 (2021), 235-258. https://doi.org/10.25253/99.2021232.13