What is wanted to be done with this article is to follow the traces of the analytical colour teaching before his the second period, in which Ludwig Wittgenstein abandoned his early views and restructured his whole philosophy in the context of “language games”. Wittgenstein’s views on the phenomenon of colour matured after 1929, when he returned to philosophy, largely abandoning his early ideas. The philosopher who had to deviate from these views to a great extent due to the contradictory views he put forward regarding the colour propositions, especially in his early work called Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus, in his second period of philosophy, he saw colour propositions as meaningless sentences declaring a logical necessity, and focused on the use of the chain of colour words in language rather than what colours are. What Wittgenstein is trying to do is to point out the importance of learning the way of using color words in language, to demonstrate that although colors are essentially unknown, how they appear to us can be described, and the common ground of consensus in language is explained through language games. Thus, Wittgenstein’s analytical color teaching preserves its originality as a philosophical theory that reveals the logical analysis of color words in the language unlike Goethe’s psychological color theory and Newton’s physiological color theory. Thus, with this article, the way in which the phenomenon of “colour” is handled in Wittgenstein’s philosophy will be evaluated and how the words of colour (no matter what tone we all associate them within ourselves) allow us to achieve a common ground of consensus in the language because we label the same tone, with the same name, with the same consistency each time, will be discussed.