Yıl: 2021 Cilt: 0 Sayı: 70 Sayfa Aralığı: 73 - 89 Metin Dili: Fransızca DOI: 10.26650/annales.2021.70.0003 İndeks Tarihi: 27-05-2022

Short-Termism in Publicly Listed Companies and Corporate Governance

Öz:
Short-termism is known as sacrificing long-term sustainable earnings for short-term returns. The pressure on management to obtain short-term results usually generates negative medium and long-term outcomes. This is because investors are inclined to sell their stocks when they hear about a shadow of bad news. In this context, business executives can decide to meet short-term shareholders expectations or prioritise the growth of their company. In other words, on the one hand, the company management should consider all possible economic variables within the scope of the necessity of protecting the company’s capital, on the other hand, it should also ensure the participation to the capital that will benefit the financial structure of the company, especially from the cash flow point of view. Short-termism hinders effective company management, particularly for publicly listed companies, due to the convenience of trading stock transactions and more transparent management decisions. Considering abovementioned facts, this study examines the increasing trend in short-termism as an intertemporal choice and discusses solutions that can be offered through corporate governance principles.
Anahtar Kelime:

Halka Açık Şirketlerde Kısa Vadecilik ve Kurumsal Yönetim

Öz:
Kısa vadecilik, pay sahiplerinin kısa dönemde kar elde etmek için uzun dönemli sürdürülebilir gelirlerini feda etmesi olarak tanımlanmaktadır. Kısa vadede getiri elde etmek isteyen şirket ortaklarının şirket yöneticilerine yaptıkları baskı orta ve uzun vadede olumsuz sonuçlar doğurmaktadır. Aslında bu durum, pay sahiplerinin ortağı oldukları şirketlere dair olumsuz bir duyum almaları halinde, paylarını derhal satışa çıkarmaya meyilli olmalarından kaynaklanmaktadır. Hal böyle iken, yöneticiler pay sahiplerinin kısa dönemli getiri beklentilerini karşılamak ya da şirketin uzun dönemli büyüme hedeflerini yerine getirmek hususlarında bir öncelik ayrımına sürüklenmektedirler. Başka bir deyişle, şirket yönetiminin bir yandan şirket sermayesinin korunması gerekliliği kapsamında olası tüm ekonomik değişkenleri derpiş etmesi gerekirken, bir yandan da şirketin finansal yapısına, özellikle nakit akışına, fayda sağlayacak sermayedar katılımını da sağlaması gerekmektedir. Bu kapsamda, özellikle halka açık şirketlerde pay devri işlemlerinin kolaylığı ve alınan kararların şeffaf olması gerekliliği gibi hususlar etkin bir yönetimin sağlanabilmesine engel teşkil etmektedir. Bu makale, yukarıda açıklanan nedenler bağlamında, kısa vadecilik cereyanını zamanlararası bir tercih problem olarak incelemekte ve kurumsal yönetim ilkeleri bağlamında sunulabilecek potansiyel çözüm önerilerini irdelemektedir
Anahtar Kelime:

Belge Türü: Makale Makale Türü: Araştırma Makalesi Erişim Türü: Erişime Açık
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APA Erdem F (2021). Short-Termism in Publicly Listed Companies and Corporate Governance. , 73 - 89. 10.26650/annales.2021.70.0003
Chicago Erdem Fatih Bugra Short-Termism in Publicly Listed Companies and Corporate Governance. (2021): 73 - 89. 10.26650/annales.2021.70.0003
MLA Erdem Fatih Bugra Short-Termism in Publicly Listed Companies and Corporate Governance. , 2021, ss.73 - 89. 10.26650/annales.2021.70.0003
AMA Erdem F Short-Termism in Publicly Listed Companies and Corporate Governance. . 2021; 73 - 89. 10.26650/annales.2021.70.0003
Vancouver Erdem F Short-Termism in Publicly Listed Companies and Corporate Governance. . 2021; 73 - 89. 10.26650/annales.2021.70.0003
IEEE Erdem F "Short-Termism in Publicly Listed Companies and Corporate Governance." , ss.73 - 89, 2021. 10.26650/annales.2021.70.0003
ISNAD Erdem, Fatih Bugra. "Short-Termism in Publicly Listed Companies and Corporate Governance". (2021), 73-89. https://doi.org/10.26650/annales.2021.70.0003
APA Erdem F (2021). Short-Termism in Publicly Listed Companies and Corporate Governance. Annales de la Faculté de Droit d Istanbul, 0(70), 73 - 89. 10.26650/annales.2021.70.0003
Chicago Erdem Fatih Bugra Short-Termism in Publicly Listed Companies and Corporate Governance. Annales de la Faculté de Droit d Istanbul 0, no.70 (2021): 73 - 89. 10.26650/annales.2021.70.0003
MLA Erdem Fatih Bugra Short-Termism in Publicly Listed Companies and Corporate Governance. Annales de la Faculté de Droit d Istanbul, vol.0, no.70, 2021, ss.73 - 89. 10.26650/annales.2021.70.0003
AMA Erdem F Short-Termism in Publicly Listed Companies and Corporate Governance. Annales de la Faculté de Droit d Istanbul. 2021; 0(70): 73 - 89. 10.26650/annales.2021.70.0003
Vancouver Erdem F Short-Termism in Publicly Listed Companies and Corporate Governance. Annales de la Faculté de Droit d Istanbul. 2021; 0(70): 73 - 89. 10.26650/annales.2021.70.0003
IEEE Erdem F "Short-Termism in Publicly Listed Companies and Corporate Governance." Annales de la Faculté de Droit d Istanbul, 0, ss.73 - 89, 2021. 10.26650/annales.2021.70.0003
ISNAD Erdem, Fatih Bugra. "Short-Termism in Publicly Listed Companies and Corporate Governance". Annales de la Faculté de Droit d Istanbul 70 (2021), 73-89. https://doi.org/10.26650/annales.2021.70.0003