Since the phenomenon of blindness in general, and color blindness in particular, is defined by the concepts of people who see normally, it is not possible for those people to learn to use neither the names of colors nor the words blindness or color blindness like a normal person, according to Wittgenstein. However, for Wittgenstein, it is possible for the seeing people to describe what they see, to the blind, or at least to teach the chain of use at the language level, similar to the fact that the use of color words can also be taught to the blind. Same thing is true the other way around too: the unique way of seeing/not seeing of blind people can also be described phenomenologically to the people who see normally. For this reason, for someone who is colorblind or blind in general, blindness or color blindness is something that learned, while for someone who sees normally, the phenomenon of seeing is not something that can be learned. For this purpose, from the start, after mentioning the distinction between what is and what appears, in the context of learnable and teachable language games, interpersonal differences in color and appearance in Wittgenstein, the color teachings of Newton and Goethe will be discussed roughly, and an analytical interpretation of the phenomenon of seeing will be developed in the light of Wittgenstein's logical color teaching. As a matter of fact, in Wittgenstein, knowing what seeing is depends on learning the use of the word seeing in the language. For this reason, the logical analysis of the phenomenon of seeing will be discussed in the chain of use of the language through the concepts of language games, and family similarities.