The Crimean War was initiated as a classical Ottoman-Russian encounter and gradually turned into a struggle between great powers. The first year of the war took place on two fronts as other Ottoman-Russian wars of the 19th century until it turned into a European war. Due to its proximity to Istanbul, the Danubian Front was strategically more important than the Caucasian. The defensive strategy of the Ottoman army was shaped by the topography of the region. The Ottomans aimed to take the advantage of natural obstacles to the invading army, such as the Danube River and the Balkan Mountains. Military activities on the Danubian Front in 1853-54 were mostly in line with the Ottoman strategy of war. However, there were some changes. Although the main objective of the Ottoman troops was to defend their positions, they still showed some limited offensive performance. Moscow’s lack of a clear military target and the hesitancy are the main reasons for the failure. The Ottoman army, to some extent, managed to use indecisiveness and slowness of the Russian troops to their advantage. The Ottoman armies seemed superior in almost every fight against the Russians. It can be argued that the Ottoman army took more initiative than previous encounters with the advantage of the international conjuncture. Nevertheless, the Ottoman Empire did not give up a defensive strategy while avoiding a decisive battle and taking any risks. This study evaluates the siege of Silistre together with the battles of Olteniçe, Çatana, and Yergöğü, and discusses the Ottoman military strategy and performance.