When the case at hand concerns two -or more- conflicting fundamental rights, the Turkish Constitutional Court (“the TCC” or “the Court”) consistently carries out a proportionality analysis to resolve the conflict. It is beyond doubt that the proportionality analysis should be carried out on a case-by-case basis, with particular attention to the incidental factors presented by each particular case. It is to be admitted that this dependence on incidental factors of each case may render it difficult for the courts to ensure an impeccable consistency among their judgments decided through a proportionality analysis. That being so, the varying methods and outcomes of the proportionality test and the overall inconsistencies in the case-law of the TCC arguably exceeds the apprehensible limits. Even at a glance, one can see several cases which, while being visibly similar as to their facts, were judged to have dramatically different outcomes, either by using different criteria or deducting different results while using the same criteria; and in both cases without proper justification. Judging differently in similar cases may prejudice the principle of legal certainty, a point that the TCC itself emphasises. The paper takes its standing point from this particular concern. After examining the structural form of the proportionality analysis (which the TCC seems to apply), the study goes onto introducing -and vindicatingthe “Law of Competing Principles”, a rule proposed by Robert Alexy. It is argued that by implicitly or explicitly recognizing the Law of Competing Principles, the TCC would effectively mitigate inconsistencies in its case-law. In the second part of the study, concrete inconsistencies in the Court’s case-law are presented and explained with the help of theoretical framework offered in the first part. The study concludes that the TCC should clarify the criteria it takes into account when conducting the proportionality analysis; it should apply the same or similar criteria when examining similar cases; it should stick with its previous ratio decidendi save in exceptional cases; and finally, if it is necessary to diverge from previously decided rationes, it should offer adequate justification as to the necessity and reasons of this diversion. Keywords: Human Rights, Constitutional Court, Proportionality, Balancing, Robert Alexy, Freedom of Expression, Conflicting Rights