Asymmetric Information and Adverse Selection in Insurance Markets: The Problem of Moral Hazard

TUMAY, Meltem

Asymmetric Information and Adverse Selection in Insurance Markets: The Problem of Moral Hazard

Meltem TUMAY (Barclays Bank, UK)

Yönetim ve Ekonomi: Celal Bayar Üniversitesi İktisadi ve İdari Bilimler Fakültesi Dergisi

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Yıl: 2009 Cilt: 16 Sayı: 1 Sayfa Aralığı: 107 - 114 Metin Dili: Türkçe İndeks Tarihi: 29-07-2022

Asymmetric Information and Adverse Selection in Insurance Markets: The Problem of Moral Hazard

Öz:

Asimetrik Bilgi problemi bir ekonomik islemin taraflarından birinin dogru bir karar verebilmek için diger taraf hakkında eksik bilgiye sahip oldugu durumlarda ortaya çıkan bir problemdir. Öte taraftan Etik Tehlike kavramı ise, bir sözlesmenin tamamlanmasından sonra taraflardan birinin digerinin zararina olacak sekilde davranisini degistirmesi riskini ifade eder. Sigorta Piyasalarında Etik Tehlike kisilerin sigorta ettirilen seyin zarara ugramasi veya çalınmasi risklerine karsı daha az çaba harcamasi seklinde ortaya çikar.

Anahtar Kelime:

Sigorta Piyasalarında Asimetrik Bilgi ve istenmeyen Tercih: Etik Tehlike Problemi

Öz:

The problem of asymmetric information occurs when one party of an economic transaction has insufficient knowledge about the other party to make accurate decisions. The moral hazard, on the other hand, is the risk that one party to a contract can change their behaviour to the detriment of the other party once the contract has been concluded. In insurance market the moral hazard is tendency by which people expend less effort protecting those goods which are insured against theft or damage.

Anahtar Kelime:

Belge Türü: Makale Makale Türü: Derleme Erişim Türü: Erişime Açık

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APA	TUMAY M (2009). Asymmetric Information and Adverse Selection in Insurance Markets: The Problem of Moral Hazard. , 107 - 114.
Chicago	TUMAY Meltem Asymmetric Information and Adverse Selection in Insurance Markets: The Problem of Moral Hazard. (2009): 107 - 114.
MLA	TUMAY Meltem Asymmetric Information and Adverse Selection in Insurance Markets: The Problem of Moral Hazard. , 2009, ss.107 - 114.
AMA	TUMAY M Asymmetric Information and Adverse Selection in Insurance Markets: The Problem of Moral Hazard. . 2009; 107 - 114.
Vancouver	TUMAY M Asymmetric Information and Adverse Selection in Insurance Markets: The Problem of Moral Hazard. . 2009; 107 - 114.
IEEE	TUMAY M "Asymmetric Information and Adverse Selection in Insurance Markets: The Problem of Moral Hazard." , ss.107 - 114, 2009.
ISNAD	TUMAY, Meltem. "Asymmetric Information and Adverse Selection in Insurance Markets: The Problem of Moral Hazard". (2009), 107-114.

APA	TUMAY M (2009). Asymmetric Information and Adverse Selection in Insurance Markets: The Problem of Moral Hazard. Yönetim ve Ekonomi: Celal Bayar Üniversitesi İktisadi ve İdari Bilimler Fakültesi Dergisi, 16(1), 107 - 114.
Chicago	TUMAY Meltem Asymmetric Information and Adverse Selection in Insurance Markets: The Problem of Moral Hazard. Yönetim ve Ekonomi: Celal Bayar Üniversitesi İktisadi ve İdari Bilimler Fakültesi Dergisi 16, no.1 (2009): 107 - 114.
MLA	TUMAY Meltem Asymmetric Information and Adverse Selection in Insurance Markets: The Problem of Moral Hazard. Yönetim ve Ekonomi: Celal Bayar Üniversitesi İktisadi ve İdari Bilimler Fakültesi Dergisi, vol.16, no.1, 2009, ss.107 - 114.
AMA	TUMAY M Asymmetric Information and Adverse Selection in Insurance Markets: The Problem of Moral Hazard. Yönetim ve Ekonomi: Celal Bayar Üniversitesi İktisadi ve İdari Bilimler Fakültesi Dergisi. 2009; 16(1): 107 - 114.
Vancouver	TUMAY M Asymmetric Information and Adverse Selection in Insurance Markets: The Problem of Moral Hazard. Yönetim ve Ekonomi: Celal Bayar Üniversitesi İktisadi ve İdari Bilimler Fakültesi Dergisi. 2009; 16(1): 107 - 114.
IEEE	TUMAY M "Asymmetric Information and Adverse Selection in Insurance Markets: The Problem of Moral Hazard." Yönetim ve Ekonomi: Celal Bayar Üniversitesi İktisadi ve İdari Bilimler Fakültesi Dergisi, 16, ss.107 - 114, 2009.
ISNAD	TUMAY, Meltem. "Asymmetric Information and Adverse Selection in Insurance Markets: The Problem of Moral Hazard". Yönetim ve Ekonomi: Celal Bayar Üniversitesi İktisadi ve İdari Bilimler Fakültesi Dergisi 16/1 (2009), 107-114.