This article examines the institution of ‘postponing the elections’ regulated in Article 78 of the Constitution. In the first chapter, the subject is discussed under comparative constitutional law. Accordingly, two categories are identified as “prohibition models” and “appreciation models”. The second category is more suitable, and the examples involving qualified majority clauses are inspiring for Turkey. In the second chapter, the subject is discussed under the preparatory works. What is found from this source is that the constituent power did not deliberately and willingly give place in the Constitution to the reasons for postponement other than a state of war. In the third chapter, the subject is discussed in light of the decisions of the High Election Board and the Constitutional Court. The conclusion drawn from this source is that the former case law in question cannot be a precedent of the current situation. In the fourth chapter, the subject is examined from the point of future-possible problems. As a result of this examination, it is concluded that some amendments should be made to the Constitution.